


If there be war with Spain the best history of it, from week to week, will be found in THE NATIONAL TRIBUNE.

# National



# Tribune.

To learn how the United States make war read Headley's "Great Rebellion." See 12th page (Supplement).

ESTABLISHED 1877—NEW SERIES.


WASHINGTON, D. C., THURSDAY, MARCH 31, 1898.—WITH SUPPLEMENT.

VOL. XVII—NO. 25—WHOLE NO. 868.


## NEW SHIPS FOR OUR NAVY.

Launching of the Kearsarge and the Kentucky at Newport News, Va., March 24, 1898.

(The illustrations of the battleships are from photographs taken by THE NATIONAL TRIBUNE artist.)



THE KENTUCKY AFTER LAUNCHING.



THE KEARSARGE AFTER LAUNCHING.

### A WEEK NEARER WAR.

Preparations for the Struggle Have Gone on With Unabated Activity.

The President Makes a Number of Tentatives to Test Public Sentiment. Feeling Universal That the Time Has Arrived for Decisive Action—No Patience With Dilatory, Temporizing Propositions—Arrival of the Report of the Board of Inquiry—Its Reception by Congress—An Important Meeting of Party Leaders at the White House.

The past week has been one of feverish unrest among the people. Preparations for active hostilities have gone on with the greatest activity. Every nerve has been strained to put our seacoast in a proper condition for defense, to increase the Army and Navy's personnel, to add to the number of our fighting ships, and to put them into the best shape for active work.

At this date it is altogether likely that our long seaboard has been made reasonably secure from attack, and our important cities absolutely so. Our ships have been concentrated into the best strategic positions, and their number greatly increased. Our agents abroad have succeeded in actually buying but two battleships, one of which is on its way to the United States, and will shortly be in active service in one of our fleets. Some needed torpedo boats have been bought abroad, and a large number of yachts and other craft capable of being readily converted into war vessels have been bought at home, and are being rapidly fitted for their new purpose.

These will prove very valuable. A large portion of the Spanish navy consists of very light gunboats, employed around Cuba. Our new acquisitions will be very useful in hunting these down and getting rid of them. The Spanish appear at their best in light, small, worrying raids, and we need to be fully prepared to meet them in this way.

WANT SOMETHING DECISIVE DONE. All this activity and purposefulness have not been sufficient to meet public expectations. The people are getting very tired of the long delay in bringing matters to an issue with Spain, and their utterances are beginning to be overwhelming for an end to be made to the whole business. They


are very much more determined upon war than the Administration, and strongly dissatisfied that the President does not assume a firmer, more energetic tone in his communications to Spain.

The President, who is nothing if not a skillful politician, has been sending out what the French call "façons d'essai"—trial balloons—to see which way the wind is blowing. Inspirations in regard to arbitration, mediation, another trial of autonomy, modified Spanish rule, indemnity, armistice, etc., have been given out, only to be met with immediate and indignant rejection by the people. They feel that the domination of Spain in any form is a relic of cruel barbarism, and that there is but one way to deal with it, and that is to end it at once and decisively. They are weary of the circumlocutions of diplomacy. Straightforward and direct themselves in all the business of life, they have no patience with the tortuous ways of diplomacy. Their clear "horse-sense" makes them understand that Spain is only fighting for time, and wanting to amuse us till our indignation is cooled, and we have become engrossed with other matters.

#### REPORT OF THE BOARD.

The report of the Board of Inquiry was transmitted by the President to Congress last Monday, accompanied by a message which was a severe disappointment to the country, which expected a much more decisive utterance. The feeling was so strong that the President was speedily made aware of it, and at once summoned to the White House for conference a number of the leading men from both Houses, and representing all divisions of political opinion, of these visitors, diplomatically informed the President that the message had been disappointing and had been regarded as lacking in strength. There seems to be no doubt, however, that Congress would wait a day or two for the President to formulate his policy before taking the matter in its own hands.

So thoroughly was the President made acquainted with the situation in Congress that he finally decided to abandon his intention of sending in on Tuesday his proposed message on Cuban relief. It will not be transmitted for a day or two, during which time the President hopes that the



THE LAUNCHING—THE KENTUCKY ENTERING THE WATER.

present excited state of feeling will reach a more tractable stage. The Cuban correspondence is also to be withheld for the present at least.

The President has been emphatically informed that if he sends in a message which proposes nothing more than an appropriation for the relief of the Cubans, it will be impossible to hold Congress from acting on its own responsibility. Unless he assumes a firm and vigorous tone some amendment will be added to the resolution appropriating the \$500,000, and the recognition of independence will be the least form of intervention that will be proposed. Senator Foraker will offer a resolution in the Senate recognizing the independence of Cuba, and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations is ready to act upon this or some more radical proposition.

#### NO USE FOR AN ARMISTICE.

The President discussed with all of his visitors the scheme of armistice which the Spanish Government, through Minister Woodford, is now endeavoring to have him accept. He was told, however, that it would be futile to attempt any negotiation with Spain that did not meet the approval of the insurgents, and that they would not be satisfied with anything less than complete and absolute independence.

The President was also told that Congress would not accept any proposition that did not immediately demand Spain's abandonment of the present concentration policy, and to this the President acquiesced, saying that he, too, would like to see it ended. Regarding the armistice, the President was informed that it would be regarded throughout the country as direct aid to the Spanish cause, inasmuch as it would allow Spain to concentrate her fleets around the island and, by pre-

venting arms and supplies from reaching the insurgents, enable her to reduce the insurgent force by a system of starvation more extended than that applied by Weyler to the peaceful inhabitants.

#### SPAIN'S ATTITUDE.

The Spaniards have been playing a very shrewd diplomatic game. While talking reforms and peace and what they propose to do for Cuba, they are, on the other hand, stirring up public sentiment against us, making a show of getting ready for war, and hunting through Europe for allies. In the latter they have been grievously disappointed. No one will promise the least active assistance, and scarcely anyone will give any show of even moral support. Little as the Germans, the French, the Austrians or the Italians may like us, or like to see us gobble up Cuba, they have an acute perception of the advantages of uninterrupted trade with our profitable markets, and profound respect for the power we are able to wield by land and sea. France, from whom Spain expected very much, states that the utmost that can be looked for from her is an offer of mediation. The Pope makes the same offer.

The report of our Board of Inquiry and the undeniable accounts of the barbarities committed in Cuba by the Spanish policy put the rights of the business so clearly and strongly on our side as to be very deterring to European sympathies. Spain feels very hopeless, helpless and alone.

#### REPORT OF BOARD OF INQUIRY.

Fixes No Responsibility, but Says Maine was Destroyed by a Submarine Mine.

The report of the Board of Inquiry on the Maine disaster reached Washington on the night of March 24. Lieutenant-Commander Marix, Judge-Advocate of the Board, had it in charge. He was accompanied by Lieut. John Hood, Lieut. C. W. Jungen, Passed Assistant Engineer F. A. Bowers, Cadet Amon F. Boyd, Assistant Engineer J. R. Morris, and Carpenter G. M. Helm. It was handed to the President on Friday morning and considered by the Cabinet.

When President McKinley on Monday last sent to Congress the report of the Board it was accompanied by the testimony and a special message, in which the President simply reviews the circumstances connected with the sending of the Maine to Havana, her destruction, and the effect of the calamity upon the people. He gives the conclusions of the Board, but does not place the responsibility. He concludes:

"I have directed that the finding of the Court of Inquiry and the views of this Government thereon be communicated to the Government of Her Majesty, the Queen Regent, and I do not permit myself to doubt that the sense of justice of the Spanish Nation will dictate a course of action suggested by honor and the friendly relations of the two Governments. It will be the duty of the Executive to advise the Congress of the result, and in the meantime deliberate consideration is invoked."

The message was referred in both houses to the committees appointed to consider foreign affairs. The House adjourned; Senator Money addressed the Senate on Cuba.

#### TEXT OF THE REPORT.

The report of the Board of Inquiry is as follows: In re Explosion of the U. S. S. Maine. Before a Court of Inquiry, Key West, Fla., Monday, March 21, 1898.

U. S. S. IOWA, 1st Rate, Key West, Florida, Monday, March 21, 1898. After full and mature consideration of all the testimony before it, the Court finds as follows:

1. That the United States battleship Maine arrived in the harbor of Havana, Cuba, on the 25th day of January, 1898, and was taken to Buoy No. 4, in from five and a half to six fathoms of water, by the regular Government Pilot.

2. That the United States battleship Maine was destroyed by a submarine mine.

3. That the United States battleship Maine was destroyed by a submarine mine.

4. That the United States battleship Maine was destroyed by a submarine mine.

5. That the United States battleship Maine was destroyed by a submarine mine.

6. That the United States battleship Maine was destroyed by a submarine mine.

7. That the United States battleship Maine was destroyed by a submarine mine.

Nothing was stowed in any one of the magazines or shell rooms which was not permitted to be stowed there. The magazines and shell rooms were always locked after having been opened, and after the destruction of the Maine the keys were found in their proper place in the Captain's cabin, everything having been reported secure that evening at 8 p. m.

The temperatures of the magazines and shell rooms were taken daily and reported. The only magazine which had an undue amount of heat was the after 10-inch magazine, and that did not explode at the time the Maine was destroyed.

The torpedo warheads were all stowed in the after part of the ship under the ward room, and neither caused nor participated in the destruction of the Maine.

The dry run-cotton primers and detonators were stowed in the cabin aft and in the ward room of the explosion.

Waste was carefully looked after on board the Maine to obviate danger. Special orders in regard to this had been given by the commanding officer.

Varnishes, driers, alcohol and other combustibles of this nature were stowed on or above the main deck, and could not have had anything to do with the destruction of the Maine.

The medical stores were stowed aft under the ward room and in the after part of the ship.


No dangerous stores of any kind were stowed below in any of the other store rooms. The coal bunkers were inspected daily. Of those bunkers adjacent to the forward magazines and shell rooms, four were empty, namely, "B 3," "B 4," "B 5," "B 6." "A 15" had been in use that day, and "A 16" was full of New River coal. This coal had been carefully inspected before receiving it on board. The bunker in which it was stowed was accessible on three sides at all times, and the fourth side at this time on account of bunkers "B 4" and "B 6" being empty. This bunker, "A 16," had been inspected that day by the engineering officer on duty.

The fire alarms in the bunkers were in working order, and there had never been a case of spontaneous combustion of coal on board the Maine.


The two after boilers of the ship were in use at the time of the disaster, but for auxiliary purposes only, with a comparatively low pressure of steam, and being tended by a reliable watch. These boilers could not have caused the explosion of the ship. The four forward boilers have since

been found by the divers, and are in a fair condition.

On the night of the destruction of the Maine everything had been reported secure for the night, at 8 p. m., by reliable persons, through the proper authorities, to the commanding officer. At the time the Maine was destroyed the ship was quiet, and therefore least liable to accident caused by movements from those on board.



VIEW OF THE DOUBLE-TURRETED MONITOR PURITAN.



THE OLD KEARSARGE AS SHE APPEARED IN 1894